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THE REALITY OF WORK-RELATED STRESS: AN ANAL-
YSIS OF HOW MENTAL DISABILITY CLAIMS SHOULD
BE HANDLED UNDER THE NORTH CAROLINA WORK-
ERS' COMPENSATION ACT*
I. INTRODUCTION
North Carolina enacted its Workers' Compensation statute1
in 1929 to provide compensation to employees who suffer an injury
or disease as a result of their employment.2 There are numerous
types of claims filed under this Act. The following are two distinct
examples.
Stanley Livingston was employed as a superintendent in a
home-building business.' His job required him to ensure that
home sites were clean.4 On May 16, 1985, Mr. Livingston was told
to remove a pile of trash, which was six to eight feet in diameter.5
He was unable to find any of the men who usually removed the
trash, so he undertook the assignment himself.6 He had been
working about an hour when he began feeling stiffness in his back,
which worsened during the two hours he spent moving the deb-
ris. 7 After being diagnosed with a lumbar disc disease and under-
going surgery on June 12, 1985, he filed a workers' compensation
claim for his physical injury.'
Teresa Williford worked as a service representative for Bell-
south Telecommunications for ten to eleven years. 9 Her job
required her to take incoming calls from customers, add telephone
services, change services, and handle bill inquiries and adjust-
* The author would like to thank Patrick Anders for his contributions in the
selection and development of the topic for this comment.
1. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -143 (1991).
2. Sandra M. King & Bryant D. Webster, Employment Covered Defenses,
Workers Compensation, 56, 56 (Wake Forest University School of Law, 1997).
3. Livingston v. James C. Fields & Co., 93 N.C. App. 336, 336, 377 S.E.2d
788, 788 (1989).
4. Id., 377 S.E.2d at 788.
5. Id., 377 S.E.2d at 788.
6. Id., 377 S.E.2d at 788.
7. Id., 377 S.E.2d at 788.
8. Id., 377 S.E.2d at 788.
9. Williford v. BellSouth Telecommunications, I.C. No. 640303, 3 (1997)
(This case is currently being appealed to the Full Commission.). (On file in Law
Review Office).
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ments. 10 She was instructed to question customers to determine
what services they wanted or needed and to sell as many services
as possible.'1 At the same time she was required to disclose
mandatory information and stay within certain time limits.
1 2
Pressure was also placed on her to sell as much as possible as
quickly as possible.' 3 As a service representative, Ms. Williford's
calls were periodically monitored with no warning other than a
green light on her computer.' 4 If she said something she was not
supposed to, or left information out of a presentation, she was sub-
ject to reprimand or termination. 5 Under the terms of her union
contract, she could be expected to work up to thirteen consecutive
days with only a couple of days off before returning to work.16 Fol-
lowing a leave of absence from work and attendance in the Ameri-
can Day Treatment Program for depression, Ms. Williford filed a
workers' compensation claim, seeking compensation for work-
related depression. 7
These cases illustrate two very different types of claims under
the North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act. Which, if either,
should be compensable? Surprisingly, Ms. Williford's claim, 8
which was completely subjective in nature was compensated,
while Mr. Livingston's back injury claim,19 capable of being mea-
sured objectively, was denied.
10. Id.
11. Id.
12. Id.
13. Id.
14. Id.
15. Williford, I.C. No. 640303 at 4.
16. Id.
17. Id. at 7.
18. This claim was compensated, even though the defense showed that while
Ms. Williford was being treated at the American Day Treatment Center the
majority of her complaints were regarding her family in general, and more
specifically, her teenage daughter. In addition, one of Ms. Williford's own
experts stated that there is an epidemic of depression and it is not unique to
employees of telephone companies. Another one of the plaintiffs experts testified
that 15% of the population gets depressed at some point in their life. And
according to an assessment completed while Ms. Williford was at the American
Day Treatment Center, she was a caretaker in a highly demanding, needy
family, and she described herself as being pulled in all directions by her family.
(From Defendant's Contentions which are on file in North Carolina Industrial
Commission's Office).
19. In Livingston, 93 N.C. App. at 337, 377 S.E.2d at 788, the Court of
Appeals cited to the correct case, Richards v. Town of Valdese, 92 N.C. App. 222,
374 S.E.2d 116 (1988) in their decision. However, the case was applied in a
322 [Vol. 20:321
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One of the most widely argued issues in workers' compensa-
tion law is whether mental or emotional disabilities caused by
occupational stress should be compensable. Claims involving
mental disability can be split into three categories: (1) those where
a physical injury precipitates a mental disability, (2) those where
the stress allegedly causes a physical injury such as a heart attack
or stroke, and (3) those where mental stimuli cause purely mental
injuries, commonly referred to as mental-mental claims. 20 This
comment will focus solely on mental-mental claims.
The workplace seems to become more stressful, or perhaps
employees' awareness of stress increases, with each passing year.
Where twenty years ago job-related stress claims were rare or
unheard of, the topic is now hotly debated with a commensurate
rise in the number of claims filed under the workers' compensa-
tion statutes. 21 The American Psychological Association predicts
that stress-related injuries "will be the most pervasive occupa-
tional disease of the 21st century."22 Mental disorders already
rank "among the top ten work-related injuries and illnesses in the
nation."2 3
Legislatures initially determine whether to compensate
mental-mental claims. However, it is ultimately left to the courts
of each state to interpret the Workers' Compensation Acts and set
the guidelines for analyzing the compensability of each individual
claim. The focus of this Comment will be on the compensability of
surprising manner. In Richards, a volunteer fireman, who had had back pain off
and on for years, filed a claim after fighting a fire over a ten to fifteen hour
period. Richards, 92 N.C. App. at 223, 225, 374 S.E.2d at 117, 119. While in full
gear, he had to jump on and off of the fire truck repeatedly, and although he
could not point to any specific time or event, the court allowed his claim. Id. at
225-26, 374 S.E.2d at 119. The court reasoned that an injury arising from a
specific traumatic incident is compensable. Id. at 225, 374 S.E.2d at 118-19. A
specific traumatic incident was defined as an injury that did not occur gradually,
but one that occurred at a cognizable time. Id., 374 S.E.2d at 119. In Richards,
the court stated that a ten to fifteen hour time span could be a cognizable time.
In Livingston, however, a two hour time period was not.
20. 3 Arthur Larson & Lex K. Larson, Larson's Workmen's Compensation
Law §§ 42.00-42.23, at 7-575 to 7-679 (1997).
21. William C. Nugent, Comment, When Employees Seek Workers'
Compensation for Stress, 14 Emp. Rel. L.J. 239, 239 (1988) (11% of occupational
disease claims asserted work-related stress as the source).
22. Aya V. Matsumoto, Comment, Reforming the Reform: Mental Stress
Claims under California's Workers' Compensation System, 27 Loy. L.A. L. Rev.
1327, 1335 (1994).
23. Id. at 1335.
1998] 323
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mental-mental claims under the North Carolina Workers' Com-
pensation Act. Section II will discuss the background and under-
lying purpose of workers' compensation law generally and the
North Carolina Act specifically. Section III will outline the
mental-mental disability claim itself. Section IV will analyze the
mental-mental claim under the North Carolina Workers' Compen-
sation Act while also tracing the mental-mental disability cases
under the Act to show the current status of the law in North Caro-
lina. Section V will make a recommendation that mental-mental
claims should be barred as a general rule, with exceptions made
for accidents and diseases above and beyond those pressures and
stresses from which all employees suffer.
II. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF WORKERS'
COMPENSATION ACTS
At common law, an employee hurt on the job was not likely to
win in a suit against his employer because he had to resort to the
established rules and practice of tort law.24 While the employee
could claim damages for personal injuries including pain and suf-
fering and was entitled to a trial by a jury of his peers, the odds
were heavily stacked in favor of the employer.25 The employer
had the resources to wage a vigorous defense against the disabled
employee who often could not afford counsel. In addition, the
employee ultimately suffered damage to the employer-employee
relationship because of the stigma associated with suing one's
employer.26
In the early 20th century, as the industrial revolution
matured, a trend toward the adoption of workers' compensation
remedies for injured employees developed throughout the coun-
try.27 State legislatures enacted workers' compensation statutes
to assure income to workers who suffered disabling injuries on the
job, to provide treatment and rehabilitation for work-related inju-
ries, and to facilitate a return to work.28
24. Loann S. Meekins, Benefits Available to Employees, Workers'
Compensation, 114, (Wake Forest University School of Law, 1997). (For
example, the employee had to prove the negligence elements: duty, breach of
duty, proximate cause, and damages, while avoiding defenses such as
contributory negligence and assumption of the risk.)
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Matsumoto, supra note 22, at 1332.
[Vol. 20:321324
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Workers' compensation was designed to eliminate the con-
cepts of fault and negligence, focusing instead on the employer-
employee relationship and the cause of the injury.29 It was not
designed to replace accident and health insurance, but rather to
impose expenses directly attributable to the hazards of industry to
industry itself.30 Where health and accident insurance generally
provides blanket coverage on an individual twenty-four hours a
day, seven days a week, workers' compensation simply provides
coverage for on the job injuries. In addition, the cost of health and
accident coverage is borne by the individual as are any out-of-
pocket expenses such as co-payments and deductibles. Workers'
compensation eliminates these expenses by providing financial
and medical benefits in an efficient, dignified, and uniform man-
ner to employees sustaining work-connected physical injuries.31
To recover under workers' compensation, the statutes require
that the disability result from the work relationship. 2 The major-
ity of states, including North Carolina, use the phrases "arising
out of' and "in the course of employment" to define the required
causal connection between the job and the injury.33 These two
phrases are not synonymous as they involve two distinct ideas. 4
However, they are not totally independent of one another because
both are part of a single test to determine work-connection. 5 An
29. Id. at 1332.
30. Brian B. Bolton & Robert L. Dietz, No (Victor) Wine Before Its Time:
Revisiting the Expanding Compensability of Heart Attacks Eight Years Later, 70
Oct. Fla. B.J. 77, 77 (1996).
31. Monica Gall, Note, Gardner v. Van Buren Public Schools: Compensating
Mental Disabilities under Workers' Compensation, 1995 Det. C.L. Rev. 223, 223
(1995) (citing Whetro v. Awkerman, 174 N.W. 2d 783, 785 (1970)).
32. Thomas S. Cook, Workers' Compensation and Stress Claims: Remedial
Intent and Restrictive Application, 62 Notre Dame L. Rev. 879, 881 (1987).
33. Id. at 882; see also, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(6) (1991). Some examples of
other states using this language are: Alabama: ALA. CODE § 25-5-51 (1992);
Arizona: ARrz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23-1021 (West 1995); Florida: FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 440.02(17) (West 1991); Georgia: GA. CODE ANN. § 34-9-1(4) (1992); Maryland:
MD. CODE ANN., LAB. & EMPL. § 9-101(b)(1) (1991); Ohio: OHIo REV. CODE ANN.
§ 4123.01(C) (Anderson 1995); Pennsylvania: PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 77, § 411(1)
(1992); South Carolina: S.C. CODE ANN. § 42-1-160) (Law. Co-op 1985); and
Virginia: VA. CODE ANN. § 65.2-101 (Michie 1995).
34. Sweatt v. Rutherford County Bd. of Educ., 237 N.C. 653, 75 S.E.2d 738
(1953) (where the court stated, it has been uniformly held that the two phrases
involve two ideas and impose a double condition); see also, Barham v. Food
World, Inc., 300 N.C. 329, 266 S.E.2d 676 (1980).
35. Lee v. F.M. Henderson & Assoc., 284 N.C. 126, 131, 200 S.E.2d 32, 36
(1973) (where the court stated that the phrases are both part of single test of
1998] 325
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injury "arises out of" employment if it is the result of a risk to
which the employee was exposed because of the nature, condi-
tions, obligations, or incidents of the employment.36 The "course
of employment" requirement examines the time, place, and cir-
cumstances of the injury in relation to the employment. 7 These
requirements are fairly uniform throughout the states.
In 1929, the North Carolina Legislature adopted the North
Carolina Workers' Compensation Act 38 as an exclusive remedy for
workplace injuries.39 The Legislature created the Act to provide
compensation to employees who suffer from an injury or disease
arising out of and in the course of their employment.4 0 The Act
ensures compensation to the employee who sustains a job-related
injury or contracts an occupational disease, generally regardless
of fault by the employer or contributing fault by the employee.41
The philosophy supporting the North Carolina Workers' Compen-
sation Act is that wear and tear on the employee, as well as the
machinery, should be charged to the industry.42
The North Carolina Act abrogates certain common law rights
held by employees, granting employers a limited and determinate
liability.43 The Act substitutes common law rights with a system
of monetary payments calculated upon the actual loss of wages.44
It is designed to protect all parties since it provides the employee
with the certainty of compensation for an injury suffered in the
course of employment. 45 For the employer, the Act reduces the
unpredictability of loss by placing compensation on an actuarial
work-connection, and that deficiencies in the strength of one are sometimes
allowed to be made up by strength in the other); see also, Watkins v. City of
Wilmington, 290 N.C. 276, 281, 225 S.E.2d 577, 581 (1976).
36. Cook, supra note 32, at 882; see also, Withers v. Black, 230 N.C. 428, 53
S.E.2d 668 (1949); Taylor v. Twin City Club, 260 N.C. 435, 132 S.E.2d 865 (1963).
37. Cook, supra note 32, at 882; see also, Plemmons v. White's Serv., 213 N.C.
148, 195 S.E. 370 (1938); Powers v. Lady's Funeral Home, 306 N.C. 728, 295
S.E.2d 473 (1982).
38. N.C. GEN STAT. §§ 97-1 to -143 (1991).
39. § 97-10.1; see also Brown v. Motor Inns of Carolina, Inc., 47 N.C. App. 115,
266 S.E.2d 848 (1980).
40. King & Webster, supra note 2, at 56.
41. Id.
42. Id. (citing Cates v. Hunt Construction Co., Inc., 267 N.C. 560, 148 S.E.2d
604 (1966)).
43. Id.
44. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-31 (1984); see also, Branham v. Denny Roll & Panel
Co., 223 N.C. 233, 236, 25 S.E. 2d 865, 867 (1943).
45. Barber v. Minges, 223 N.C. 213, 216, 25 S.E.2d 837, 839 (1943).
326 [Vol. 20:321
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basis.46 Workers' compensation is in effect a bargain between
industry and the worker where the worker is guaranteed recovery,
but the recovery is limited for the benefit of the industry.
For an injury to be compensable under the North Carolina
Workers' Compensation Act,47 the employee must prove two
things. First, the employee must prove that an employer-
employee relationship did in fact exist.48 Second, the employee
41must establish that the employment was the cause of the injury.4,
The existence of the employer-employee relationship is deter-
mined by common law.5 °
The test to be applied in determining whether the relationship of
the parties under a contract for the performance of work is that of
employer and employee, or that of employer and independent con-
tractor is whether the party for whom the work is being done has
the right to control the worker with respect to the manner or
method of doing the work, as distinguished from the right merely
to require certain definite results conforming to the contract.5 1
To prove the causation requirement, the second element an
employee must satisfy for an injury to be compensable under the
North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act, the employee must
satisfy a three pronged test: (1) that the claimant suffered a per-
sonal injury by accident, which (2) was sustained in the course of
employment, and (3) that the injury arose out of the employ-
ment.52 These are the prerequisites for a claimant to receive
compensation.
The first prong of the causation test requires that the
employee's personal injury be caused by an accident and there
46. Id. at 216, 25 S.E.2d at 839.
47. N.C. GEN. STAT. §§ 97-1 to -143 (1991).
48. Hicks v. Guilford County, 267 N.C. 364, 148 S.E.2d 240 (1966) (holding
that in order to recover, a claimant must prove that he is a member of the class
protected and the Act applies only where the employer-employee relationship
exists.); see also, Richards v. Nationwide Homes, 263 N.C. 295, 139 S.E.2d 645
(1965); Hart v. Thomasville Motors, Inc., 244 N.C. 84, 92 S.E.2d 673 (1956).
49. Lewis v. W.B. Lea Tobacco Co., 260 N.C. 410, 132 S.E.2d 877, (1963) (Here
the court stated that the injury must spring from the employment.); see also,
Clark v. Burton Lines, Inc., 272 N.C. 433, 158 S.E.2d 569 (1968); Robbins v.
Nicholson, 281 N.C. 234, 188 S.E.2d 350 (1972).
50. King & Webster, supra note 2, at 65.
51. Hicks, 267 N.C. at 367, 148 S.E.2d at 243.
52. Hollar v. Montclair Furniture Co., Inc., 48 N.C. App. 489, 490, 269 S.E. 2d
667, 669 (1980) (citing Gallimore v. Marilyn's Shoes, 292 N.C. 399, 233 S.E. 2d
529 (1977)).
1998] 327
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must be a specific finding of this fact.53 An accident is not a
"series of events in employment, of a similar or like nature, occur-
ring regularly, continuously or at frequent intervals in the course
of such employment, over extended periods of time."54 Instead,
the North Carolina Supreme Court has defined an "accident" as
an "untoward and unlooked for event which is not expected or
designed by the injured employee." 5 In essence, an accident
occurs when there is either an interruption to the normal work
routine or when some event arises that is not part of the normal
work routine.56
The second prong mandates that the injury be sustained in
the course of the employment. The course of employment element
has been broadly defined. It only requires that the employee was
performing an authorized task intended to benefit the employer's
business.5 7
The final prong of the causation test is that the injury must
arise out of the employment. The injury arises out of the employ-
ment when it is a natural and probable risk of the job or the natu-
ral result of a risk inherent with that particular employment, so
that a causal relationship exists between the job and the injury."
The injury must spring from the job and have its origin in the
job.5 9 It must be "apparent to the rational mind upon considera-
tion of all of the circumstances, a causal connection between the
conditions under which the work is required to be performed and
the resulting injury."60
53. Jackson v. Fayetteville Area Sys. of Trans., 78 N.C. App. 412, 413, 337
S.E.2d 110, 111 (1985) (there needs to be a specific finding of fact regarding if
employee sustained an injury and to the nature of that injury).
54. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-52 (1991); see also Bowles v. CTS of Asheville, Inc.,
77 N.C. App. 547, 335 S.E.2d 502 (1985).
55. Harding v. Thomas and Howard Co., 256 N.C. 427, 428, 124 S.E.2d 109,
110 (1962).
56. Gladson v. Piedmont Stores, 57 N.C. App. 579, 292 S.E.2d 18. (1982).
57. Powers v. Lady's Funeral Home, 306 N.C. 728, 730, 295 S.E.2d 473, 475
(1982).
58. Perry v. American Bakeries Co., 262 N.C. 272, 274, 136 S.E.2d 643, 645
(1964).
59. Bolling v. Belk-White Co., 228 N.C. 749, 750, 46 S.E.2d 838, 839 (1948).
60. Harden v. Thomasville Furniture Co., 199 N.C. 733, 735, 155 S.E. 728,
729-30 (1930) (quoting In re Employers' Liability Assurance Corp., 102 N.E. 697,
697 (Mass. 1913)).
328 [Vol. 20:321
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III. THE MENTAL DISABILITY CLAIM
Workers' compensation was originally designed to compen-
sate for work-related physical injuries that prevented an individ-
ual from continuing to work.6 1 As technology developed,
employers began requiring more mental than physical effort. This
in turn created new stresses in the workplace. 62 A high number of
stressful events are inevitable in industry because companies
must maintain or increase profitability to stay viable in the mar-
ket.63 Companies must offer new products and new services to
increase its share of the market.64 These types of changes cause
different duties and responsibilities for employees.65 Companies
must also adapt to changing economic, political, social, legal, and
environmental conditions. 66 Any change in the work place may
produce stress in employees. 67 As education and awareness have
increased in the general public, there have been changes in our
attitudes regarding mental illnesses, decreasing the stigma
attached to mental disease.68 . Consequently, there has been a tre-
mendous increase in job-related stress claims. State legislatures
and courts are left scrambling to find reliable ways to analyze
these claims under current workers' compensation statutes.69
Stress can be defined as anything that places an extra
demand on an individual.7 0 Modern science has confirmed that
human beings do have a general response to all forms of stress. 71
The response follows the same course regardless of the cause of
the stress and the purpose of the response is to bring relief from
the stress.72 American physiologist Dr. Walter Cannon called this
61. Christy L. DeVader & Andrea Giampetro-Meyer, Reducing Managerial
Distress about Stress: An Analysis and Evaluation of Alternatives for Reducing
Stress-Based Workers' Compensation Claims, 31 Santa Clara L. Rev. 1, 4 (1990).
62. Id. at 5.
63. SALVATORE R. MADDI & SUZANNE C. KOBASA, THE HARDY ExEcUrVE:
HEALTH UNDER STRESS 78 (Dow-Jones Irving 1984).
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id.
68. Matsumoto, supra note 22, at 1336.
69. Gall, supra note 31, at 248.
70. ROBERT L. VENINGA & JAMES P. SPRADLEY, THE WORK STRESS CONNECTION
HOW TO COPE WITH JOB BURNOUT 16 (Little, Brown & Co. 1981).
71. Id. at 18.
72. Id.
1998] 329
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reaction the "fight or flight" response, arguing that it plays an
important role in survival because it readies the body for action.73
While modern science has identified the physical response of
the body to stressful situations,74 science is still less certain about
mental disabilities.75 This uncertainty creates problems for the
courts. First and foremost, the uncertainty of mental diseases
makes it difficult for courts to ascertain the "true nature, extent,
and cause of injury."76 The problem is compounded by the subjec-
tive nature of the psychological condition.77 Doctor's opinions as
to the cause of mental illness are premised upon the claimant's
subjective answers to questions and tests.7" Thus, very little, if
any, objective criteria exist to aid the courts.
Another major difficulty with the mental disability claim is in
determining whether the injury in fact results from work-related
stress or from stress in the claimant's personal life.7 9 No tests
exist that can distinguish between work-place stress and per-
sonal-life stress. Therefore, in many instances, an employer may
be compensating an individual for stress induced injuries that in
reality were not caused by the employment.8 0 This was not the
intent behind workers' compensation. General health insurance
should cover such an injury. An employer cannot be liable for lost
73. Id. at 19.
74. There is a tiny bundle of nerve cells at the center of the brain that send
alarm signals throughout the nervous system. Veninga & Spradley, supra note
70, at 20. These messages cause muscles to tense and blood vessels to constrict
while the tiny capillaries under the skin shut down all together. Id. Hormones
are released to increase the energy supply which subsequently raises the pulse
rate. Id. The brain utilizes a series of electrochemical distress reactions to
stimulate the kidneys to secrete two sets of hormones. MADDI & KOBASA, supra
note 63, at 18. One set breaks down organic compounds into simpler elements,
increasing the amount of fats, cholesterol, and sugar in the bloodstream to
prepare the body for great expenditures of energy. Id. The other set of hormones
increase heart rate and constrict arteries, mobilizing the body and increasing the
blood pressure. Id. These hormones also cause breathing to become shallow and
rapid. Id. The end result of this process is that sleep becomes difficult and the
mind begins to race with depressive thoughts. Id.
75. Gall, supra note 31, at 249.
76. Id.
77. Celeste M. Harris, Occupational Disease, Workers' Compensation, 109,
133 (Wake Forest University School of Law, 1997).
78. Id.
79. Marc A. Antonetti, Labor Law: Workers' Compensation Statutes and the
Recovery of Emotional Distress Damages in the Absence of Physical Injury, 1990
Ann. Surv. Am. L. 671, 672 (1992).
80. See supra note 18.
330 [Vol. 20:321
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wages to an individual who is having financial trouble or going
through a divorce. Employers should only pay individuals who
were truly disabled by their employment.
IV. NORTH CAROLINA MENTAL DISABILITY CLAIMS
Stress is an ordinary part of life. This reality makes it diffi-
cult to prove that any given occupation produces significantly
more stress than that which the general public encountersAs The
mental-mental claim is a relatively new and constantly developing
area of law in North Carolina, and as such these claims are not
specifically set out in the North Carolina Workers' Compensation
Act. North Carolina courts have addressed the issue of mental-
mental claims in two contexts: claims naming the mental disabil-
ity as an occupational disease, and claims involving mental disa-
bilities which resulted from a particular event.
A. Mental Disability as an Occupational Disease
One way for a claimant to possibly recover under the Act for a
stress-related condition is based upon N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-53,
dealing with occupational diseases.82 While some occupational
diseases are enumerated, 3 and stress is not, employees claiming
a mental-mental injury must therefore attempt to fit the mental
disability within the "catch-all" provision. The "catch all" defini-
tion of an occupational disease is:
Any disease.. .which is proven to be due to causes and conditions
which are characteristics of and peculiar to a particular trade,
occupation or employment, but excluding all ordinary diseases of
life to which the general public is equally exposed outside of the
employment.8 4
Therefore, mental-mental injuries are compensable in North
Carolina as occupational diseases only if the claimant establishes
that the mental disability is the result of factors in the work place
and that the work place created a condition which subjected him
to more stress than the general public.8 5 The Act does not require
81. Harris, supra note 77, at 132.
82. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53 (1991).
83. § 97-53(22-25); Examples include: carbon monoxide poisoning, poisoning
by sulphuric, hydrochloric, or hydrofluoric acid, asbestosis, and silicosis.
84. § 97-53(13).
85. Barbara L. Curry, Current Medical Issues in Workers' Compensation,
Workers' Compensation in North Carolina, 75, 77 (National Business Institute,
1996).
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that the employment be the only cause of the injury, nor are all
ordinary diseases of life excluded. The only diseases excluded are
those common to the public. However, the employment must
expose the employee to risks distinguishable in character and
quantity from occupations generally or from non-occupational
activities.8 6 In other words, the employment must present a risk
that the employee would otherwise generally not encounter.
Despite this apparent difficulty in presenting such proof, North
Carolina courts are becoming more likely than not to find such
claims compensable. The reason for this is a lack of clear directive
from the legislature.
One of the first mental-mental claims in North Carolina was
Harvey v. Raleigh Police Department.7  In 1978, Michael
Wichmann was hired as a Raleigh Police Officer, and as part of
the application process psychological tests were administered. 8
The tests showed no signs of anxiety or depression.8 9 While his
first year on the force was rocky, 90 his performance greatly
improved over the years, and he received a promotion in 1981. 91
In 1982, he began working part-time as a security guard for
K-Mart while maintaining his full-time status as a Raleigh Police
Officer.92 On May 19, 1982, he was placed on administrative leave
from the police department pending investigation of allegations
that he stole a candy bar from a store.9 3 On May 28, 1982, he was
told that he could not work off-duty while on administrative
leave.94 In addition, he had been named as a co-defendant with K-
Mart in a suit alleging false arrest.9 5 On May 31, 1982, following
a fight with his wife, Mr. Wichmann committed suicide.9 6
His widow filed a death claim under the North Carolina
Workers' Compensation Act alleging that her husband's death
86. Mills v. Mills, 68 N.C. App. 151, 154, 314 S.E.2d 833, 836 (1984); see also,
Gay v. J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc., 79 N.C. App. 324, 339 S.E.2d. 490 (1986).
87. Harvey v. Raleigh Police Dep't, 96 N.C. App. 28, 384 S.E.2d 549 (1989).
(Harvey H)
88. Harvey v. Raleigh Police Dep't, 85 N.C. App. 540, 541, 355 S.E. 2d 147,
148 (1987). (Harvey I)
89. Id., 355 S.E.2d at 148.
90. Id., 355 S.E.2d at 148.
91. Harvey II, 96 N.C. App. at 30, 384 S.E.2d at 550.
92. Id., 384 S.E.2d at 550.
93. Id., 384 S.E.2d at 550.
94. Id., 384 S.E.2d at 550.
95. Id., 384 S.E.2d at 550.
96. Id., 384 S.E.2d at 550.
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was a result of work induced depression, an occupational dis-
ease. 97 Since Wichmann did not seek psychological treatment
prior to his death, the claimant hired an expert to conduct a "psy-
chological autopsy" which involved interviewing the decedent's
family and reviewing employment records, school records, and any
psychiatric notes available. 98 The purpose of the "autopsy" was to
determine his state of mind at time of death. 99 The diagnosis from
this "autopsy" was that Mr. Wichmann suffered from a depression
that was significantly contributed to by his job. 100 The employer's
expert stated that it was impossible to determine the origin of a
mental disease that was undiagnosed prior to the victim's
death.'01 The Industrial Commission denied the claim, stating
that Wichmann's job as a police officer was not a significant factor
in the depression that ultimately led to his suicide.' 02
Mrs. Wichmann appealed to the Court of Appeals, which
remanded the case to the Commission with instructions to show
the absence of any of the causation elements.10 3 The Commission
then held that the claimant had not met her burden of proof as the
evidence indicated that the deceased employee's stress came from
financial difficulties and his home environment rather than from
his job.' Testimony from other officers showed Wichmann
enjoyed his work but was also concerned about financial difficul-
ties. 10 Decedent's widow appealed once more, but the Court of
Appeals upheld the Commission's ruling stating that "Itihe bur-
den of proving each and every element of compensability is upon
the plaintiff," and that there was sufficient evidence to support the
Commission's findings. 10 6
The result suggests that the burden of proof lies solely on the
claimant to prove that the stress was in fact job-induced. The only
thing the court could have improved upon was to state the rule in
unequivocal terms. Given the subjective nature of the diagnosis of
mental-mental disabilities, there is no feasible or just way for
employers to prove that outside stress is the cause of mental dis-
97. Harvey I, 85 N.C. App. at 541, 355 S.E.2d at 148.
98. Id., 355 S.E.2d at 148.
99. Id., 355 S.E.2d at 148.
100. Id at 541, 355 S.E.2d at 149.
101. Id. at 542, 355 S.E.2d at 149.
102. Id, 355 S.E.2d at 149.
103. Harvey 1, 85 N.C. App. 540, 355 S.E.2d 147.
104. Harvey 11, 96 N.C. App. at 31, 384 S.E.2d at 551.
105. Id. at 33, 384 S.E.2d at 552.
106. Id. at 35, 384 S.E.2d at 553.
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ease. No one is more aware of the various stressors in an
employee's life than the employee himself. Therefore, the only
rational result is to make the employee eliminate all stressors
other than those that are work-related as the proximate cause of
the mental-mental disability.
Less than three years later, the law was re-examined and
expanded by the Court of Appeal's holding in Cross v. Blue Cross/
Blue Shield.10 7 In May 1987, Ms. Vivian Cross accepted a job as a
medical review examiner with Blue Cross Blue Shield. 08 She
resigned from this position in September 1987 alleging job-related
stress.'0 9 Ms. Cross filed a claim under the Workers' Compensa-
tion Act alleging that her psychological problems were work
induced.110
The evidence showed that Ms. Cross's job duties involved tak-
ing telephone requests for authorization of medical expenses and
procedures, processing the authorizations, and distributing infor-
mation on medical claims."' These duties seemed to be too much
for Ms. Cross, as she received at least three memos concerning
unsatisfactory performance." 2 In addition to her unsatisfactory
performance at work, she also missed work without calling in or
providing the requested medical verifications for employee
absence.113
To support her mental-mental claim, Ms. Cross relied on dep-
osition testimony from Dr. Naftel, a third-year psychiatry resident
who examined her in 1987." However, Dr. Naftel never stated
unequivocally that the cause of her problems was job-related. He
simply stated that given the description of Ms. Cross' job "she was
having trouble keeping up with what is going on there [at work],
and generally for people that's stressful.""' 5 The Commission
denied her claim premised on occupational disease." 6
The Court of Appeals found many outside stressors, which
contributed to the claimant's condition. Ms. Cross had exper-
ienced the death of her sister in 1985 and the death of her brother
107. 104 N.C. App. 284, 409 S.E.2d 103 (1991).
108. Id. at 285, 409 S.E.2d at 104.
109. Id., 409 S.E.2d at 104.
110. Id., 409 S.E.2d at 104.
111. Id. at 286, 409 S.E.2d at 104.
112. Id., 409 S.E.2d at 104.
113. Cross, 104 N.C. App. at 286, 409 S.E.2d at 104.
114. Id., 409 S.E.2d at 104-5.
115. Id. at 287, 409 S.E.2d at 105.
116. Id. at 285, 409 S.E.2d at 104.
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in 1986.117 She underwent an abortion in 1987 and broke up with
her boyfriend during the same year. 1 8 These stressors, coupled
with her poor job performance, seem to constitute the reasons
behind the court's upholding of the Commission's ruling.11 9
Cross is important because by even considering the claim, the
court recognized the general compensability of psychological
claims under the "catch all" provision 2 ° of the North Carolina
Workers' Compensation Act. The Cross court's holding, however,
implies that an important distinction is to be made between stress
resulting from the inability to adequately perform one's job and
stress caused by the demands of the job. The Cross court implied
that if the demands of the job create stress, then compensation
can be awarded. No mention was made of whether the stress has
to be unique to that particular profession, which is a requirement
of the statute. 12' This is an erroneous oversight, creating cover-
age where none in fact exists.
Furthermore, prior case law 22 makes clear that the employ-
ment must expose the employee to risks distinguishable in charac-
ter and quantity from occupations generally, while at the same
time they shall not be a series of events of a similar or like nature,
occurring regularly in the course of such employment. 123 In Har-
vey, there existed risks that occurred regularly in the course of
employment and in Cross, risks to which the public was equally
exposed. This holding illustrates that the Cross court should have
mandated that claimants bear the burden of proving that it was
the job stress alone that was the proximate cause of their mental-
mental disability.
In 1995, the court addressed the issue of intervening
causes. 124 William Baker was a detective with the Sanford Police
Department. 25 From 1981 until 1990, he was the lead investiga-
tor for all major crimes, including homicides. 126
117. Id. at 288, 409 S.E.2d at 106.
118. Id., 409 S.E.2d at 106.
119. Cross, 104 N.C. App. at 288, 409 S.E.2d at 106.
120. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13) (1991).
121. See § 97-53(13) (requiring that the disease be "proven to be due to causes
and conditions which are characteristic of and peculiar to a particular trade,
occupation or employment").
122. Gay v. J.P. Stevens & Co., 79 N.C. App. 324, 339 S.E.2d. 490 (1986).
123. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-52 (1991).
124. Baker v. City of Sanford, 120 N.C. App. 783, 463 S.E. 2d 559 (1995).
125. Id. at 784, 463 S.E.2d at 560.
126. Id., 463 S.E.2d at 560.
1998] 335
15
Berry: The Reality of Work-Related Stress: An Analysis of How Mental Dis
Published by Scholarly Repository @ Campbell University School of Law, 1998
CAMPBELL LAw REVIEW
Mr. Baker filed a claim for workers' compensation disability
benefits alleging that one particular homicide trial in 1989 caused
him to begin experiencing fear and stress. 27 Evidence showed
that most of his time in late 1989 was spent at home and at work
alone in a dark room.128 A doctor diagnosed him with "agitated
depression 'related to his job and to his stress at work.' ' 129 The
doctor testified that while he did not believe that the one trial was
the only factor, Mr. Baker's work was a significant factor in his
development of depression.130  Testimony from Baker's wife
revealed that he had attempted suicide in 1990 "because, although
he loved his job, he had a lot invested in it, and it was 'getting to
him.'"131
However, the evidence showed that his job was not the only
stressor in his life. In February 1990, Mr. Baker's brother was
found dead.' 32  Mr. Baker did not return to work after his
brother's death, but was hospitalized for depression. 33 He was
diagnosed with "major depression" which is a disease "that is not
just brought on by a situation, but is related to chemical imbal-
ances coupled with physical and psychological elements.' 34 Mr.
Baker's doctor testified that this depression had begun before the
brother's death, and that the death was "the last straw" before
bringing the disease to "a head."
1 35
The Industrial Commission did find that prior to the brother's
death, Mr. Baker had indeed developed depression as an occupa-
tional disease. However, it ruled that such depression was not
disabling; therefore it was not compensable. 36 Furthermore, the
Commission held that the death of Mr. Baker's brother caused the
"major depression" and that the "major depression" was not a
"direct and natural result of [Mr. Baker's] work depression." 137
127. Id. at 784, 463 S.E.2d at 561.
128. Id., 463 S.E.2d at 561.
129. Id., 463 S.E.2d at 561.
130. Baker, 120 N.C. App. at 784, 463 S.E.2d at 561.
131. Id. at 785, 463 S.E.2d at 561.
132. Id., 463 S.E.2d at 561.
133. Id., 463 S.E.2d at 561.
134. Id., 463 S.E.2d at 561.
135. Id., 463 S.E.2d at 561.
136. Baker, 120 N.C. App. at 786, 463 S.E.2d at 562. (The Commission ruled
that while Mr. Baker developed depression prior to his brother's death, he was
still able to work, therefore it was the death of his brother that made his
condition disabling and not his job.)
137. Id., 463 S.E.2d at 562.
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Therefore, the death of the brother was deemed an intervening
cause, and Mr. Baker's claim for benefits was denied. .13
On appeal, the Court of Appeals relied on the standard set out
in Rutledge v. Tultex Corp .139 to determine whether an occupa-
tional disease existed under section 97-53(13) of the Workers'
Compensation Act.14° For a disease to be occupational, it must be:
1) characteristic of persons engaged in the particular trade or
occupation in which the claimant is engaged; 2) not an ordinary
disease of life to which the public generally is equally exposed
with those engaged in that particular trade or occupation; and 3)
there must be a causal connection between the disease and [claim-
ant's] employment. 141
The Commission in Baker determined that the resulting
"major depression" was not attributable to Mr. Baker's employ-
ment. However, the Court of Appeals reversed this ruling,
because of the possibility that the loss of the brother served to
aggravate the occupational disease that had already existed.1 4 2
Still relying on Rutledge, the court stated that it is not necessary
that the sole cause be work-related, but that compensation is
mandated when the employment is a contributing factor to the
disability. 4 3 The case was remanded to the Commission with
instructions to determine whether the job was a significant factor
in the disease's development.1 4 4
In Baker, the court misapplied the Rutledge test. Everyone
experiences stress, whether due to relationships, money, or status
in society. Every job has stress, from the teenager working a
backed up drive-thru to the executive whose company is having
financial difficulty. There is no accurate, objective way to deter-
mine whether an individual's mental disability is work-related or
personal, especially in a case such as Baker where there is uncon-
troverted evidence of work and personal stress. Baker is a testa-
ment to the fact that stress causing mental injury is an ordinary
disease of life to which everyone is subject. This is obvious. But
by ignoring the obvious the court implied that ordinary diseases to
138. Id. at 788, 463 S.E.2d at 563.
139. 308 N.C. 85, 301 S.E.2d 359 (1983).
140. Baker, 120 N.C. App. at 787, 463 S.E.2d at 562-63.
141. Rutledge, 308 N.C. at 93, 301 S.E.2d at 365.
142. Baker, 120 N.C. App. at 788, 463 S.E.2d at 563.
143. Id., 463 S.E.2d at 563.
144. Id. at 789-90, 463 S.E.2d at 563-64.
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which everyone is subject are compensable if the employment is a
contributing factor.
By awarding compensation without regard to whether stress-
causing conditions are characteristic of and peculiar to a particu-
lar occupation and without regard to whether a disease is one to
which the public is generally exposed, the law is ignored. Such
compensation directly contradicts the North Carolina Workers'
Compensation Act and the Rutledge test.
A further example of the existing contradiction is the recent
case of Pulley v. City of Durham.45 Margie Pulley, the first
female public service officer with the City of Durham, went to
work for the City as a police officer in November 1975.146 Officer
Pulley started seeing Dr. Hostetter, a clinical psychologist, in
1984 because she felt physically ill, was having difficulty concen-
trating at work and was experiencing difficulty handling the
stresses involved with her job. 147 However, during her first ses-
sion, she described her main sources of stress as "having recently
filed bankruptcy, having problems with her Down's Syndrome
son's day care, her husband having legal problems, and his leav-
ing home periodically."14 Dr. Hostetter diagnosed Officer Pulley
"as having a major depressive disorder with some psychotic symp-
toms" which were related to her husband and child. 149 The doctor
recommended a three-month leave of absence to which Officer Pul-
ley adhered. 15 0
Officer Pulley continued seeing Dr. Hostetter after she
returned to work. 151 Shortly after Officer Pulley's return to work,
Dr. Hostetter changed her diagnosis to "longstanding events of
post traumatic stress syndrome arising from the multiple trau-
matic situations that she [Officer Pulley] encountered as a public
safety officer."1 52 Officer Pulley terminated her employment with
the City of Durham in April 1989 and filed a claim for workers'
compensation benefits for occupational stress. 153 In 1991, Officer
Pulley saw Dr. Ziel, a specialist in psychiatry, "who found that
plaintiffs [Pulley's] employment as a public safety officer was
145. 121 N.C. App. 688, 468 S.E.2d 506 (1996).
146. Id. at 689, 468 S.E.2d at 507.
147. Id., 468 S.E.2d at 507.
148. Id., 468 S.E.2d at 507.
149. Id. at 689-90, 468 S.E.2d at 507.
150. Id. at 690, 468 S.E.2d at 507.
151. Pulley, 121 N.C. App. at 690, 468 S.E.2d at 507.
152. Id., 468 S.E.2d at 507.
153. Id., 468 S.E.2d at 508.
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causally connected to plaintiffs [Pulley's] psychological
problems."154
The initial Deputy Commissioner denied her claim; however
the Full Commission reversed, finding that there was a lack of
expert opinion evidence showing that the emotional problems
were not job-related. 155 The full Commission accepted the two
doctors' opinions that Pulley's employment as a police officer sig-
nificantly contributed to her problems.15 The City of Durham
appealed. 5 7
The Court of Appeals gave absolute discretion to the findings
of the Full Commission. The court relied on the Full Commis-
sion's findings that throughout Pulley's employment she was
involved with situations where people were victims of or had com-
mitted criminal acts, as well as situations involving personal
injury and death. 158 In addition, great weight was afforded Dr
Ziel's testimony that there was a recognizable link between the
nature of police work and an increased risk of contracting depres-
sion.' 59 Based on this evidence, the court held there was sufficient
evidence for the Full Commission to conclude Officer Pulley's emo-
tional condition was job-induced. 60
Pulley, as well as Cross and Baker, leaves the law in North
Carolina in conflict with the Workers' Compensation Act itself.
The Act specifically states that to be compensable as an occupa-
tional disease, the employment must place the employee at a
higher risk than the general public. 16 1 In Pulley, there was
uncontroverted evidence that she was initially diagnosed with a
major depressive disorder in addition to some psychotic symptoms
related to her husband and child. Yet, the court stated there was
no expert opinion evidence that Officer Pulley's condition was not
job-related. However, whereas the law plainly states that the
154. Id., 468 S.E.2d at 508 (This visit to and diagnosis by the psychiatrist could
be viewed as a part of her disability claim. To recover under the workers'
compensation act for any occupational disease, the claimant must show that the
employment makes them more likely than the general public to suffer from the
disability. To be successful in showing this, a doctor's testimony is usually
required.).
155. Id., 468 S.E.2d at 508.
156. Id., 468 S.E.2d at 508.
157. Pulley, 121 N.C. App. at 690, 468 S.E.2d at 508.
158. Id. at 694, 468 S.E.2d at 510.
159. Id., 468 S.E.2d at 510.
160. Id., 468 S.E.2d at 510.
161. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 97-53(13) (1991).
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plaintiff must prove her case, here, Officer Pulley was not required
to refute the evidence of outside stressors. Under the Workers'
Compensation Act, Pulley should have been required to prove that
her condition was not a result of stressors outside of her job.
Seemingly, courts are allowing claimants to recover without prov-
ing that their job places them at a greater risk than the general
public as the statute clearly requires.
B. Mental Disability Claims Arising from a Particular Accident
Until 1996, the majority of mental disability claims were filed
as occupational disease claims. This trend began to change in Jor-
dan v. Central Piedmont Community College,162 the claimant
alleged that her mental disability was an injury by accident not an
occupational disease. 163 Ms. Jordan, the claimant, was a voca-
tional training instructor at a correctional facility. 164 Prior to her
employment, prison officials conducted an orientation session with
Ms. Jordan to explain the type of facility where she would be
working.'65 The officials disclosed to her that she would be subject
to searches and that she risked the possibility of experiencing hos-
tage situations. 166 Prison officials also reassured Ms. Jordan that
there had been no incidents involving injury or harassment by the
inmates. 167 She was instructed that if a conflict did arise, she was
to let the staff members handle it.168
After two years of employment inside the facility, Ms. Jor-
dan's classes were moved to a trailer that was about one hundred
feet from the facility and was fenced off by itself.'69 Ms. Jordan
was alone with the inmates during her class and the trailer was
not equipped with a telephone, intercom or any other means of
communication. 170
162. 124 N.C. App. 112, 476 S.E.2d 410 (1996).
163. Id. at 114, 476 S.E.2d at 411. The Workers' Compensation Act
compensates not only occupational diseases, which develop over a period of time
and are not attributable to a specific event, but also injuries resulting from
traceable accidents. See N.C. Gen. Stat. §§ 97-2(6), -52 (1991).
164. Id. at 113, 476 S.E.2d at 410.
165. Id. at 114, 476 S.E.2d at 411.
166. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 411.
167. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 411.
168. Jordan, 124 N.C. App. at 114, 476 S.E.2d at 411.
169. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 411.
170. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 411.
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On June 26, 1991, Jordan witnessed a fight between inmates
in her classroom.17 ' Although she requested that the inmates sep-
arate and leave each other alone, the fight only escalated. 7 2 Jor-
dan went outside and yelled to two guards, who happened to be
within earshot, that she needed help.' 73 These guards did not
respond and the fight continued to worsen.' 74 Ms. Jordan again
attempted to summon the guards help, but was again ignored.
75
Eventually other inmates broke up the fight that had left a broken
window and blood on the floor.'7 6
Ms. Jordan testified that before the incident she felt safe at
work because she thought the prison staff was available to assist
her in conflict situations. 177 After the incident, Ms. Jordan began
experiencing anxiety attacks, insomnia, and when she was able to
sleep, nightmares about the fight.' 7 1 She sought treatment from a
psychologist who diagnosed her as suffering from post traumatic
stress disorder as a direct result of the June 26 inmate fight. 79
Ms. Jordan filed a workers' compensation claim alleging a psycho-
logical injury by accident as a result of the inmate fight. 80 The
Commission concluded that Ms. Jordan had suffered an injury by
accident arising out of and in the course of her employment and
awarded her benefits.'"' Defendant appealed alleging that recov-
ery is not allowed under the North Carolina Workers' Compensa-
tion Act for mental injuries.8 2
The Court of Appeals disagreed with the Defendant. The
court found that "the broad intent of the Workers' Compensation
Act is to provide compensation to employees who sustain an injury
arising out of and in the course of their employment.' 8 3 Accord-
ing to the court, N.C. Gen. Stat. § 97-2(6) defines "injury" without
making a distinction between those that are physical and psycho-
171. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 411.
172. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 411.
173. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 411.
174. Jordan, 124 N.C. App. at 114, 476 S.E.2d at 411.
175. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 411.
176. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 411.
177. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 411.
178. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 411.
179. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 411.
180. Jordan, 124 N.C. App. at 114, 476 S.E.2d at 411.
181. Id. at 115, 476 S.E.2d at 411.
182. Id. at 115, 476 S.E.2d at 412.
183. Id. at 116, 476 S.E.2d at 412.
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logical. 184 The court, relying on recent cases' 85 that recognize
mental injuries as compensable occupational diseases, stated that
to hold mental injuries uncompensable as injuries by accident
would be incongruous with the compensation of such claims under
principles of tort law and would lead to harsh results. 186 Specifi-
cally, the court concluded that "as long as the resulting disability
meets statutory requirements, mental, as well as physical impair-
ments, are compensable under the Act." 8 7
Unlike some of the earlier mental-mental cases, the court in
Jordan reached the correct result. Jordan differs from previous
cases because the claimant's disability was the result of a specific
traumatic incident. The fight occurred in and during one of Ms.
Jordan's classes, in other words, during the course of her employ-
ment. Furthermore, but for her employment, she would not have
been present at the fight. Therefore, the disability was a result of
a risk involved with her employment. In addition, Jordan was
brought as an injury by accident instead of as an occupational dis-
ease. The court was correct in stating that mental disabilities
meeting the statutory requirements are compensable. Problems
only arise when a court tries to make a claim fit the requirements
of the statute when it otherwise does not."' In Jordan, the court
applied the statute in the correct way and did not try and force a
result.
V. CONCLUSION
While stressful situations may have debilitating effects on an
individual, research has shown that there are factors, which, if
present, may have a buffering effect.' 89 Perhaps the most impor-
tant buffer is individual personality.' 90 What one person inter-
prets as stressful may not be interpreted the same way by
someone else. Every individual handles stress differently. Herein
184. Id. at 117, 476 S.E.2d at 413.
185. See supra notes 124-144 and accompanying text, see also supra notes 145-
160 and accompanying text.
186. Jordan, 124 N.C. App. at 119, 476 S.E.2d at 414.
187. Id., 476 S.E.2d at 414.
188. See, e.g., Pulley v. City of Durham, 121 N.C. App. 688, 468 S.E.2d 506
(1996) (The court seemed to ignore facts, such as the claimant's filing of
bankruptcy, her husband's legal problems, and her mentally handicapped child.).
189. MADDI & KOBASA, supra note 63, at 24.
190. Id.
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lies the problem with mental disability claims being found com-
pensable under workers' compensation.
The courts have compensated mental disability claims as both
occupational disease and as accidents arising out of and in the
course of employment. Regardless of the theory asserted, it
appears that under the present regime claimants more likely than
not will recover. Is this the way the legislature intended the
North Carolina Workers' Compensation Act to be interpreted?
Arguably, no.
The purpose of workers' compensation has never been to
replace general health insurance. To compensate mental disabili-
ties as an occupational disease seems to make workers' compensa-
tion general psychological insurance. Since all jobs are stressful
to a degree, all jobs place their employees at a greater risk than
the general public to contract an emotional disability. Where is
the line drawn? Should employers administer the Minnesota
Multi-Phasic Personality Inventory psychological test along with
drug testing in the next decade? Workers' compensation was
designed to provide a remedy for those unable to work because
they were hurt on the job. It was not designed to provide financial
support for those whose personality is unsuited for the employ-
ment they chose.
As a general rule, mental disability claims, absent a physical
injury, should not be compensable under the North Carolina
Workers' Compensation Act. The Act should be amended to spe-
cifically and unequivocally bar such claims. This, admittedly dra-
conian solution, would alleviate the necessity of the courts'
interpreting the current Act. The amendment, though, should
also provide two exceptions to the general rule.
The first exception would be for claims that result from a sud-
den stimulus. This exception would protect claimants such as Ms.
Jordan, 191 who have a mental disability as a result of a sudden
occurrence. If physical disabilities are compensable due to a sud-
den, unexpected "accident," then mental claims under similar cir-
cumstances should be compensable as well. Other states 192 have
already implemented such a policy.
191. Jordan, 124 N.C. App. 112, 476 S.E.2d 410.
192. For example: Arizona: Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 23-1043.01(B) (West 1995);
Illinois: Pathfinder v. Industrial Comm'n, 343 N.E.2d 913 (Ill. 1976); Tennessee:
Jose v. Equifax, Inc., 556 S.W.2d 82 (Tenn. 1977); Texas: Bailey v. American
Gen. Ins. Co., 279 S.W.2d 315 (Tex. 1955).
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The second exception would be for claims that arise from
stimuli, which even though gradual in nature, are sufficiently
more damaging than those encountered in everyday employment.
While several states have such a rule193 the Supreme Court of
Wisconsin has announced the most coherent test. In School Dis-
trict v. ILHR Dept., 194 the court stated, "in order for a nontrau-
matically caused mental injury to be compensable in workers'
compensation cases, the injury must have resulted from a situa-
tion of greater dimensions than the day-to-day mental stress and
tension, which all employees experience. " 195
These exceptions would require specific language allocating
the burden of proof to the claimant, and excluding compensation
for stress created by disciplinary actions or job termination. Only
the individual knows the true source of his own stress 196 and
sometimes not even the individual really knows. Equity and ear-
lier case law require that the burden of proving that nonwork
stresses are not the cause of the mental disability should fall on
the claimant. Employees who are disciplined or terminated
because of poor job performance should be barred from filing a
Workers' Compensation claim. North Carolina is an employment
at-will state and companies should not incur a penalty for
demanding that an employee satisfactorily perform his job.
Neither should employees who are laid off be able to file claims
because companies are sometimes forced to downsize, whether
due to financial difficulties or a decrease in market share. Claim-
ants should be required to offer clear, convincing proof that work
is the cause of the mental disability.
In conclusion, North Carolina's current Workers' Compensa-
tion Act does not specifically address mental disability claims.
This leaves courts in the position of having to interpret the pres-
ent law, a task that has resulted in the misapplication of the occu-
pational disease requirements. It is imperative that the
193. For example: Arkansas: Owens v. National Health Lab., Inc. 648 S.W.2d
829 (Ark. 1983); Maine: Townsend v. Maine Bureau of Pub. Safety, 404 A.2d
1014 (Me. 1979); South Carolina: Powell v. Vulcan Materials Co., 384 S.E.2d 725
(S.C. 1989); and Wisconsin: Swiss Colony v. Department of ILHR, 240 N.W.2d
128 (Wis. 1976).
194. 215 N.W.2d 373 (Wis. 1974).
195. Id. at 373.
196. See Harvey v. Raleigh Police Dep't., 96 N.C. App. 28, 35, 384 S.E.2d 549,
553 (1989).
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legislature amend the Act to reflect the proper manner of
obtaining compensation for mental disability claims.
Amy S. Berry
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